Schwarcz is a Professor of Law & Business at Duke University and Founding Director of Duke’s interdisciplinary Global Capital Markets Center.
Modern financial regulation requires that derivatives contracts be cleared and settled through central counterparties, such as clearing houses affiliated with derivatives and commodities exchanges, in order to try to reduce systemic risk. This Working Lunch will examine whether regulators should also require the central clearing of non-derivative financial contracts.
Prof Schwarcz will suggest a theory of central clearing of financial contracts and its ability to reduce counterparty — and hence, systemic — risk. He will then discuss the theory’s regulatory and economic efficiency implications for current requirements to centrally clear derivatives contracts and also for deciding whether to extend central clearing to non-derivative financial contracts. This inquiry’s consequences are important because the net counterparty exposure on non-derivative financial contracts exceeds that on derivatives contracts.
You can register for this event here.
IMFS Working Lunch
Steven L. Schwarcz
Duke University School of Law
"Central Clearing of Financial Contracts: Theory and Regulatory Implications"
Room "DZ Bank", House of Finance, Campus Westend
Goethe University Frankfurt
Steven L. Schwarcz (Research and CV)