

The decline in euro area inflation and the choice of policy strategy

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Abstract

This note argues that the European Central Bank should adjust its strategy in order to consider broader measures of inflation in its policy deliberations and communications. In particular, it points out that a broad measure of domestic goods and services price inflation such as the GDP deflator has increased along with the euro area recovery and the expansion of monetary policy since 2013, while HICP inflation has become more variable and, on average, has declined. Similarly, the cost of owner-occupied housing, which is excluded from the HICP, has risen during this period. Furthermore, it shows that optimal monetary policy at the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates aims to return inflation more slowly to the inflation target from below than in normal times because of uncertainty about the effects and potential side effects of quantitative easing.

1 The challenge

In her recent speech at the conference “The ECB and its Watchers XXI”² the President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, pointed out the following major challenge that would need to be addressed by the ECB strategy review:

*“Most importantly, the last decade has been defined by a persistent decline in inflation among advanced economies. In the euro area, annual inflation averaged 2.3% from 1999 to the eve of the great financial crisis in August 2008, but only 1.2% from then until the end of 2019. ... We need to thoroughly analyse the forces that are driving inflation dynamics today, and consider whether and how we should adjust our policy strategy in response.”*³

This note aims to contribute some suggestive findings concerning possible driving forces for inflation dynamics in the past and in the future and to discuss aspects of an appropriate policy strategy.

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² The conference that was held in Frankfurt on September 30, 2020 also formed part of the ECB Listens events in the context of the ECB Strategy Review. It is part of a conference series organised by the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability. See www.imfs-frankfurt.de.

³ See Lagarde (2020).

2 Inflation measures indicate important role of import prices in the decline of consumer price inflation

As a first step, this note looks into four measures of inflation averages in the euro area between 1999:Q1 and 2020:Q1 (See Table 1). Somewhat differently from the reference provided in President Lagarde's speech the timeline is divided into three periods to better distinguish inflation dynamics during economic recession and recovery. The first period runs from 1999:Q1, when the monetary union was launched, up to 2009:Q1, when the union recorded a sharp decline of GDP. The second period is set between 2009:Q2 and 2013:Q1, that is, from the business cycle trough during the financial crisis to the trough of the euro area debt crisis. The third period, between 2013:Q2 and 2020:Q1, marks the subsequent economic recovery. The four inflation measures are 1) the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HICP), which was referred to by President Lagarde, 2) the HICP excluding energy prices, 3) the GDP deflator, which covers prices of all goods and services produced in the euro area and 4) the import price deflator, which accounts for the inflation in imported goods and services prices.

Table 1
Inflation averages

(% growth rates)

Inflation measures	Q1 1999 – Q1 2009 Up to financial crisis recession	Q2 2009 Q2 – Q1 2013 Financial crisis and euro debt crisis recessions	Q2 2013 – Q1 2020 Economic recovery up to coronavirus recession
HICP: Harmonized index of consumer prices	2.2	1.8	0.9
HICP excluding energy prices	2.0	1.4	1.1
GDP Deflator: Domestic goods price inflation	2.0	1.0	1.3
Import price deflator: Import price inflation	1.6	2.1	-0.3

Sources: Eurostat, ECB.

In the first period, the results for the HICP and the GDP deflator are very similar. The HICP averaged 2.2 %, while excluding energy prices results in an average of 2.0%. Domestic goods price inflation measured by the GDP deflator was also on average 2.0%. Yet, the GDP deflator is quite a different measure of inflation compared with the HICP. First of all, it is not based on a particular goods and services basket but on actual expenditures. Furthermore, it is quite a bit broader in coverage because it also includes prices of investment goods produced in the euro area, prices of construction investment, prices of exported goods and services, as well as prices of public goods and services. It excludes prices of imported goods and services. Thus, it is the broadest possible measure of domestic goods price inflation. Imported goods price inflation averaged only slightly lower at 1.6% throughout this period. This includes imports for consumption and investment purposes by households, firms and public sector entities, as well as imports of intermediate goods used in the production of exports.

Splitting the post-2009 period of the monetary union into two makes quite a difference relative to the observations made by President Lagarde in her speech. First, the HICP stays high on average at 1.8% between 2009:Q2 and 2013:Q1 while fluctuating much more strongly than in the preceding period. From 2013:Q2 to 2020:Q1, average HICP inflation is quite a bit lower at 0.9%. This is puzzling, because macroeconomic theory as well as past empirical observation would suggest that inflation is low in periods of recession while increasing along with economic recovery. The recent experience in the euro area is the opposite, at least as far as the HICP measure of inflation is concerned. Much of the volatility in HICP is due to energy prices. In fact, the standard deviation of HICP inflation excluding energy prices is largely unchanged at about 0.4% before and after the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the HICP excluding energy prices also exhibits a somewhat counterintuitive pattern of averages, with 1.4% during the double-recession period and 1.1% during the subsequent recovery period.

Domestic goods price inflation measured by the GDP deflator, however, is quite different on average. It came in substantially lower during the double-recession period at 1.0% and then averaged 1.3%. While this is not a large increase on average, it goes at least in the right direction as inflation increases in the economic recovery. Import prices help explain the difference between the HICP and the GDP deflator. As measured by the import deflator, import price inflation averaged 2.1% during the double recession, but fell to an average of -0.3% during the recovery. Note that the difference between the HICP and GDP deflator cannot be explained by the prices for oil and natural gas imports alone, as the HICP excluding energy prices also showed the opposite pattern with higher inflation during recession than during economic recovery. It would be of interest to estimate the import components of consumption expenditure in order to gain a deeper understanding of consumer price inflation excluding import prices. Unfortunately, national income accounts do not provide a decomposition of imports according to consumption, investment or other purposes.

Chart 1 shows the timeline for inflation measured with the HICP and the GDP deflator. Up to about 2007 the two measures provide a very similar picture of inflation dynamics. Afterwards, the HICP becomes much more volatile. The average is still high during the double-recession period because it increases towards 3% between 2011 and 2012. From 2014 onwards it fluctuates between a marginal dip into the negative territory and 2%. By contrast, the GDP deflator stays near 1% in the double-recession period and rises during the recovery period, eventually reaching 1.7% in 2019. This would roughly correspond to the ECB's numerical target of "close to but below" 2%. Bletzinger and Wieland (2017) estimate a symmetric numerical target at 1.74% based on an interest rate reaction function that fits ECB interest rate decisions from 1999 to 2013 quite well. Yet, of course, the ECB's target is formulated with respect to the HICP and not to the GDP deflator.


From 2013 onwards the ECB lowered the main refinancing rate towards zero and engaged in substantial further policy easing by means of targeted longer-term refinancing operations, as well as massive quantitative easing (QE) by the means of direct asset purchases. It is not easy to estimate the effect these measures have had

on HICP inflation due to its volatile nature. By contrast, the sustained increase in the GDP deflator matches up better with the economic recovery from 2013 onwards and the substantial policy easing conducted till 2018. Thus, taking a broader look at domestic price inflation in terms of the GDP deflator also helps in pointing out the effects of the ECB's policy.

Chart 1

Growth rates of HICP and GDP deflator in the euro area

(percentage)



1 - Working day and seasonally adjusted. 2 - Quarterly data.

Sources: ECB, Eurostat

In 2020, domestic price inflation increased further, reaching 1.9% in Q1 and 2.5% in Q2. In the meantime, HICP inflation collapsed and slid into negative territory in the fall. This decline is associated with a sharp drop of import prices, that are partially included in the HICP but excluded from the GDP deflator. Unfortunately, the GDP deflator only becomes available with a delay. The increase to 2.5% in the second quarter of 2020 is partly due to increased public sector inflation, mostly in France. This is driven by the accounting for the large-scale shutdown in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Country-level data that has so far become available for 2020:Q3 indicates lower readings of about 1.1% for Germany and France in that quarter.

Currently, ECB strategy and communication is focused almost exclusively on the HICP and core HICP measures. Yet, in order to better understand and explain the forces driving inflation since the global financial crisis it would appear helpful to take a broader look at inflation measures. This includes, in particular, domestic goods price inflation as captured by the GDP deflator. In recent years its dynamics have been somewhat more closely aligned with the business cycle and with monetary policy expansion than HICP inflation.

3 Effects of housing cost and climate policy on consumer price inflation

3.1 Rental cost and owner-occupied housing

A key element of the cost of living is housing cost which, however, is understated in the HICP, as the index includes only rental housing cost and ignores owner-occupied housing cost. This is a serious omission since the latter accounts for a large share of dwellings in the euro area: 50% in Germany and 70% or even higher in most of the member states in the currency union (Brunßen and Diehl-Wolf, 2018). Contrary to the HICP, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Germany includes owner-occupied housing cost and uses the rental-equivalency approach to estimate it. Rents for comparable rental housing are used to account for the costs of owner-occupied housing. As a result, a change in rental cost, including owners' equivalent rent, in the German CPI, is similar to a change in the actual rents considered in the German HICP. But rental cost receives essentially double weight in the CPI due to the inclusion of owner-occupied housing. The annual increase in rental costs in the CPI and in the HICP has averaged at 1.36% and 1.42% respectively since 2013. By comparison, the CPI increased by 1.16% per year and the HICP by about 1.21%. While rents increased more than the overall measures of inflation, the CPI nevertheless rose a little more slowly than the HICP for Germany. This is due to other differences. Yet there can be stronger effects on the HICP at particular points in time due to the smaller weight on rental costs. For example, in October 2020 the year-on-year rate for the CPI stood at -0.2% while that of the HICP came in at -0.5% and the early release for November indicates -0.3% and -0.7% respectively.

The rental-equivalency approach is also used in the Netherlands but not in most other euro area member states. It is argued that the share of rental housing is too small to provide sufficiently good grounds for comparison. Yet the consumer price index for the United States, which has a home ownership rate of about 65%, also includes owners' equivalent rent of primary residence (OER) (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). An estimate is obtained by means of a survey, in which homeowners are asked how much they would charge monthly if leasing their home unfurnished and without utilities. Since 2014, rent and owners' equivalent rent in the U.S. have grown at rates above 3% and have contributed to the rise in U.S. inflation. By 2018 underlying inflation as measured by the CPI excluding food and energy was stable at 2% in the United States compared to, in the euro area, 1% in HICP excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco and 1.2% in HICP excluding energy and unprocessed food. Part of the reason was the greater increase in rents and the additional weight given to owners' equivalent rent in the U.S. CPI (see also Grossmann-Wirth and Monette 2017 and Gros 2018).

Turning to the euro area, Chart 2 shows that actual rent inflation included in the HICP is much more stable than inflation measured by the HICP excluding energy. Inflation in the latter swings up and down from actual rent inflation. If a rental-equivalency approach were to be used for owner-occupied housing, then at least the

weight on rent inflation in the HICP would increase substantially, presumably to more than double the current weight. As a result, variation in the HICP excluding energy would be reduced and, presumably, show less of a decline at the current juncture.

Furthermore, since 2013 the rent inflation component included in the HICP has averaged at 1.25% annually compared to 1.10% in the HICP excluding energy. Thus, if owners' equivalent rent has increased at a similar rate to the actual rents, the inclusion of owners' equivalent rent is expected to raise HICP inflation throughout this period somewhat, but probably only a few basis points annually.

Chart 2

Growth rates of rents included HICP and HICP excluding energy

Actual rentals for housing and HICP excluding energy: Euro area

(percentage)



1 - Working day and seasonally adjusted. 2 - Not seasonally adjusted.

Sources: ECB, Eurostat, own calculations:

For a number of years, Eurostat has been developing new indices for owner-occupied housing (OOH price index) in partnership with national statistical offices. These indices are based on a net acquisition approach (European Commission, 2018) which focuses on actual monetary transactions and consumption expenditures. Thus, it is closer to the method used for the HICP in general. This method records the change over time of all expenditure incurred in the acquisition of housing, as well as purchase of goods and services related to housing.

Owner-occupied Housing Price Index (OOHPI) data are being prepared for most of the member states in the euro area but the statistics for the currency union as a whole are not available. Chart 3 shows OOHPI inflation for Germany, France, Italy and Spain. In contrast to rents, the net acquisitions cost of owner-occupied housing varies considerably across the four countries. In Germany, growth rates rose steadily from 2% in 2014 to about 5% by the end of 2018. In France, the growth rate of the OOHPI fell from 5% in 2011 to about -2% in 2013 and then moved between 0% and 3% in the following years. In Italy, OOHPI inflation declined from about 3% in 2011 to below -1% in 2014 and then stayed between 0% and 1% in recent years. The decline, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, has been most dramatic in Spain, where OOHPI inflation fell to -10% in 2012, then returned to positive territory in 2014 and rose to 6% by 2019.


The development of OOHPI inflation after the financial crisis and its great variability across the four countries suggests that the index exhibits some properties of an asset price. Of course, it could be argued that the oil price, which plays a significant role in the HICP, is also highly variable and exhibits asset price characteristics as it depends on the relationship between oil demand and the available stock of oil in the ground. However, to the extent that the net acquisitions approach includes the purchase of land, it includes an asset that is not exhausted in the production of housing services. Rather it remains available to the same extent for future housing. The price of this asset needs to be excluded if one wants to include the cost of owner-occupied housing in the consumer price index. The national accounts also treat the structure of housing as investment rather than consumption. Yet, it certainly has the aspects of a durable consumption good.

Chart 3

Owner-occupied housing indices and the HICP excluding energy

Cost of owner-occupied housing and HICP

(percentage)



1 - Not seasonally adjusted. 2 - Owner-Occupied Housing Price Index. Quarterly data.

Sources: Eurostat, own calculations.

Some practical concerns have been raised regarding the proposal to include the OOH price index in the HICP (European Commission, 2018). In particular, the OOHPI is published 100 days after the end of each quarter and has been subject to major revisions. Thus, it has been suggested that this practice is not compatible with the HICP, which is required to be published 15 days after the end of each month.

Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to explore further what can be done to include the costs of owner-occupied housing in the HICP. Furthermore, the practical difficulties in including the OOHPI directly in the production of the HICP need not in any way prevent the Governing Council of the ECB from taking these price developments into account in its policy deliberations, decisions and communications. As they represent an important component of households' cost of living, including them in communication may also help reduce the seemingly large discrepancy between households' inflation perceptions and the ECB's choice of policy target.

3.2 Climate policy and inflation

Climate change and its consequences for the planet pose a major long-term challenge to humankind. The European Green Deal of the European Commission aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050. This means by then the economy will need to meet the target of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions. Achieving this goal requires raising the price of greenhouse gas emissions, either by means of taxation or an emissions-certificate trading system. This will have substantial effects on the price of fossil fuels. Given their importance in the euro area economy overall, there will be substantial effects on production costs and overall inflation. Currently, the EU already has an emissions-trading system (EU-ETS) that covers the energy producing and the industrial sectors. The EU-ETS allows fixing overall emissions by these sectors while achieving the reduction in a cost-efficient manner. So far, transportation, heating and the agricultural sectors are not covered by this system and many member states fail to reach emissions reduction targets in these sectors. Further measures that aim to raise the cost of emissions in these sectors will likely have important effects on inflation in the euro area.

To give an example, the German Council of Economic Experts expects consumer price inflation to increase substantially in the course of 2021, from currently slightly below zero to about 2.3% by the end of 2021. The forecast of the rise in inflation is partly due to the newly introduced price of greenhouse gas emissions in transportation and heating resulting from the 2019 Federal Climate Change Act.

A recent study by GCEE staff Nöh, Rutkowski and Schwarz (2019) provides an assessment of the effect of the Federal Climate Change Act on inflation in Germany. Chart 4 shows their estimates of the impact on HICP inflation. It includes the direct effect on the prices of fuel for transportation and heating as well as the indirect effects on the prices of the consumption basket because the price on greenhouse gas emissions affects intermediate inputs used in the production of many of these goods and services. The total effect in 2021 on the German HICP is estimated at 1.2 percentage points. There are additional effects of between 23 and 45 basis points in subsequent years till 2026. The effects of the German Federal Climate Change Act on euro area HICP inflation is about a third of the effect on German HICP inflation.

If these measures are not sufficient to reduce emissions, further price increases are possible. Of course, the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions in these


sectors is to include them in the EU-ETS covering all of the EU. Expanding the EU-ETS is also a goal in the European Green Deal.

Chart 4

Germany's new CO2 Pricing and the HICP

Effects to be expected between 2021 and 2026

(percentage)



Sources: Eurostat, Federal Statistical Office, RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 2013 Grundfile 5 (HB), own calculations:

To the extent that climate policies have macroeconomic effects on inflation and growth these need to be taken into account in the design of monetary policy. Their effects may be similar to cost-push shocks. Thus, monetary policy would be faced by a trade-off between higher inflation and lower growth. The medium-term nature of the ECB's strategy for achieving price stability allows it to buffer somewhat the negative effects of cost-push shocks on economic activity in the short run. The ECB website states in this regard: "Moreover, the medium-term orientation makes it possible for monetary policy to take into account concerns about output fluctuations, without putting price stability at risk." In this case, stabilization policy would help cushion temporarily the increase in cost for fossil fuel-based production and consumption so as to avoid excessive fluctuations.

4 Implications of inflation dynamics for monetary policy at the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates

Having explored structural forces that have influenced euro area inflation dynamics in the past or will influence them in the future such as import price inflation, housing costs and climate policies, we now turn to the impact of monetary policy on inflation and the design of policy strategy. One problem is the possible existence of a lower bound on nominal interest rates due to the existence of cash that offers savers a nominal return of zero percent. The effective lower bound, which may lie below zero, together with uncertainty about the effects and side effects of QE may also be a cause of low inflation. Furthermore, it is possible that the real equilibrium interest rate has decline substantially, which may have constrained monetary policy already in the past and may also hinder the achievement of the inflation target in the future. These issues need to be taken into account in formulating a policy strategy for the future.

Some implications of these factors for the design of policy strategy are drawn out in Wieland (2020 forth.) within a simple model of inflation. The analysis in that paper builds on earlier work on optimal quantitative easing under uncertainty by Orphanides & Wieland (2000). It considers Brainard (1967)-style multiplicative parameter uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of QE as well as potential negative side effects of QE, for example with regard to financial or fiscal stability.

I now summarize key implications of optimal monetary policy at the effective lower bound (LB) when the policy instrument switches from the nominal interest rate to QE while the effects and side-effects of QE are uncertain. Here, I focus on the static case. The dynamic case is analysed in Wieland (2020 forth.). In terms of notation, π refers to the rate of inflation and π^* to the inflation target. The subscript t refers to discrete time. The nominal interest rate is denoted by i and the nominal equilibrium interest rate by i^* , while q stands for quantitative monetary policy, that is, balance sheet policy such as asset purchases.

Equation (1) describes a simple linear process governing inflation. Both interest rate deviations from the equilibrium nominal interest rate as well as QE (equilibrium level normalized at zero) have an influence on inflation.

$$\pi_t = -a(i_t - i^*) + bq_t + \pi_{t-1} + e_t \quad b \sim N(\bar{b}, \sigma_b), e_t \sim N(0, \sigma_e) \quad (1)$$

The magnitudes of the effects on inflation are governed by the parameters a and b , respectively. While the parameter a on the nominal interest rate is treated as certain, the parameter on quantitative policy is treated as uncertain with variance σ_b . Inflation shocks are denoted by e with variance σ_e . Importantly, current inflation depends on the first lag of the inflation rate. As a result, an inflationary shock e has a permanent effect on the rate of inflation in the absence of a stabilizing policy response.

The decision problem of the central bank is defined in equation (2) by the expected quadratic loss with regard to inflation deviations from target.

$$\text{Max}_{i,q} E[-(\pi_t - \pi^*)^2] \Leftrightarrow \text{Max}_{i,q} (-(E\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 - V\pi_t) \quad (2)$$

This decision problem implies a trade-off between the squared expected inflation deviations from target and the variance of inflation. Many analyses of optimal monetary policy ignore this trade-off because they only consider linear-quadratic frameworks with additive uncertainty. The multiplicative uncertainty considered here implies that policy has a direct effect on the conditional variance of inflation.

Monetary policy has to ease (tighten) in response to observed period $t-1$ inflation coming in below (above) target in order to bring period t inflation back to the target in expectation. As long as the optimal interest rate policy does not imply a level of the interest rate below the effective lower bound, it is simply given by the linear feedback rule for the nominal interest rate in equation (3), while the quantitative policy instrument remains inactive at the equilibrium value of zero.

$$\text{if } i_t \geq i^{LB} \Rightarrow i_t = i^* + \frac{1}{a}(\pi_{t-1} - \pi^*), q_t = 0 \quad E_t \pi_t = \pi^* \quad (3)$$

The reason why the optimal choice of instrument is the interest rate lies in the uncertain effects of QE. Interest rate policy is sufficient to reach the global minimum of losses where expected inflation equals the target. The conditional variance of inflation is equal to the exogenous variance of the cost push shock e . The optimal policy response coefficient is $1/a$.

However, if lagged inflation is sufficiently low that the lower bound on interest rates is binding, the optimal policy switches to QE. The resulting optimal feedback rule is given by equation (4).

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{if } \pi_{t-1} < \pi^* + a(i^{LB} - i^*) \\ i_t = i^{LB}, q_t = & -\frac{\bar{b}}{(\bar{b}^2 + \sigma_b)} (\pi_{t-1} - a(i^{LB} - i^*) - \pi^*) \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

The nominal interest rate setting corresponds to the value defined by the effective lower bound i^{LB} . The extent of QE is defined by a feedback rule that is linear in terms of lagged inflation. However, the optimal response coefficient is not $-1/b$ which would bring expected inflation in line with the target. Instead, the coefficient is smaller in absolute value and depends inversely on the variance of the multiplicative parameter b , that is σ_b . If the parameter b were known with certainty, σ_b would be equal to zero and the optimal response coefficient would simplify to $-1/b$. But the greater the degree of uncertainty, the smaller the optimal policy response coefficient. Optimal QE optimally trades off the policy impact on the expected inflation deviation from target for the impact on the conditional variance of inflation. As a result, the inflation rate is expected to be below target in period t and to approach the target from below in subsequent periods.

$$E\pi_t < \pi^*$$

Thus, when policy is constrained by the lower bound on nominal interest rates it may be optimal to have inflation converge more slowly to target from below, because of uncertainty about the effects of QE. This is a form of Brainard (1967)-style policy attenuation under multiplicative parameter uncertainty.⁴

Even if the effects of QE on inflation were as equally well understood and precisely estimated as the effects of changes in the central bank rate, there are additional reasons for caution, for instance the potential negative side effects of QE. One of the main channels of policy transmission for asset purchases by the central bank is the so-called portfolio-balance effect. It remains operative with constant interest rates. As investors shift away from the assets bought up by the central bank they re-allocate their portfolios towards riskier assets. This behaviour lowers risk premia and boosts asset prices. It is argued that there is a potential for excessive asset price increases that induces financial fragility. Furthermore, depressing term premia induces low long-term rates and a flat yield curve. This encourages risk taking by the banks and is likely to lead to greater interest rate risk on bank balance sheets. A reduction of bank profits due to a reluctance to pass on negative interest rates to customers may even raise the effective lower bound on interest rates.

⁴ For the implications of estimation uncertainty and learning see Wieland (2006).

Recently, the question of QE side effects has also played an important role in the judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the need for observing proportionality in monetary policy, in particular with regard to the risk of fiscal dominance (see Feld and Wieland 2020). Importantly, the Governing Council of the ECB regularly balances the benefits and side effects of asset purchases, as explained in the ECB Accounts from the Governing Council meeting held between June 3rd and 4th, 2020:

“Overall, there was broad agreement among members that while different weights might be attached to the benefits and side effects of asset purchases, the negative side effects had so far been clearly outweighed by the positive effects of asset purchases on the economy in the pursuit of price stability. However, it was also noted that it could not be ruled out that unintended effects could increase over time and eventually outweigh the overall positive effects. It was thus seen as important to continuously assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the monetary policy measures, their transmission channels and their benefits and costs.”

Wieland (2020) incorporates the risk of side effects in a simple and straightforward manner into the decision problem of the central bank outlined above. Side effects of QE are denoted by the variable z . As shown in equation (5), the z process depends on the QE indicator q and a shock s with mean zero and variance σ_s .

$$z_t = cq_t + s_t \quad c \sim N(0, \sigma_c), s_t \sim N(0, \sigma_s) \quad (5)$$

The parameter c which governs the magnitude of negative side effects is assumed to have mean zero and variance σ_c . This implies that the central bank expects no side effects but nevertheless takes into account a risk of side effects.

Thus, the central bank’s optimization problem is extended as follows:

$$\underset{i, q}{Max} E[-(\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 - \lambda z^2] \quad (6)$$

λ denotes the weight assigned to the side effects z in the central bank loss function. Again, QE only comes into play when lagged inflation is sufficiently low that the central bank interest rate cannot be lowered enough to bring inflation back to its target. The optimal feedback rule is shown in equation (7). There is an additional term in the denominator of the optimal policy response coefficient denoted by $\lambda\sigma_c$. As a result, the policy response to inflation is further attenuated. The degree of attenuation is a function of the product of the weight, which the central bank assigns to the side effects in the loss function and the risk of such side effects, as measured by the variance σ_c .

$$i_t = i^{LB}, q_t = -\frac{\bar{b}}{(\bar{b}^2 + \sigma_b + \lambda\sigma_c)} (\pi_{t-1} - a(i^{LB} - i^*) - \pi^*) \quad (7)$$

In sum, a central bank that takes into account the risk of QE side effects considers it optimal to approach the inflation target from below, when the effective lower bound is binding.

$$E\pi_t < \pi^*$$

The simple model developed here highlights several implications of the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates for the ECB Strategy Review. To this end, consider the following non-negativity condition on interest rate policy implied by the model:

$$[i_t - i^{LB}]_+ = \left[r^* + \pi^* + \frac{1}{a}(\pi_{t-1} - \pi^*) - i^{LB} \right]_+ \quad (8)$$

First, as shown by equation (8), the severity of the constraint implied by the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates depends importantly on the value of the nominal equilibrium interest rate, $i^* = r^* + \pi^*$. This was already recognized by early studies of what was then called the zero-lower-bound on nominal interest rates. Orphanides and Wieland (1998), Orphanides and Wieland (2000), Coenen and Wieland (2003) and Coenen, Orphanides and Wieland (2004) analysed the impact of the zero-bound constraint for different values of i^* and its two components. Coenen, Orphanides and Wieland (2003) estimated its value at 3.7% for the U.S. economy. These earlier studies typically concluded that a value of the equilibrium nominal rate near 4% would provide sufficient room for monetary stabilization policy. This would result, for example, from an equilibrium real rate of about 2%, which was a common estimate at the time, and an inflation target around 2%. These considerations and analyses also played an important role in the mid-term review of the ECB strategy in 2003 (see the background studies in Issing 2003). At the time, the ECB Governing Council clarified “that, in the pursuit of price stability, it aims to maintain the rate of inflation below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.”

In recent years, there have been many studies following the vein of Laubach and Williams (2016) and Holston, Laubach and Williams (2017), documenting a large decline of estimates of the real equilibrium interest rate r^* for the U.S. and other advanced economies. Some of these estimates are even in negative territory. Yet, the time frame of the estimated equilibrium is unclear — sometimes a five-year horizon is mentioned — and the estimates remain highly uncertain (Beyer and Wieland 2019). Even so, such a decline of r^* would imply that the zero lower bound will be binding more frequently. The regular survey of members of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) currently implies a median estimate of the long-run federal funds rate of 2.5% together with a long-run inflation rate of 2% for the U.S. economy (Federal Reserve Board 2020). This constitutes a decline in the equilibrium nominal rate of 1.2% relative to the estimate used by Coenen, Orphanides and Wieland (2004) for their analysis of the impact of the zero-lower-bound on U.S. monetary policy. Accordingly, the implicit estimate of the long-run real equilibrium interest rate by the median FOMC member corresponds to 0.5%.

One option would be to raise the inflation target π^* by a similar amount of, say between 1% and 1.5%. This would offset the effect of the decline in r^* on i^* . Raising the inflation target is proposed in a number of contributions to the ECB’s strategy review, including some studies at this Sintra conference. Equation (8) underscores, however, that the effect of raising π^* is not the same as raising r^* when inflation is low and the central bank already cut the nominal interest rate to the lower bound. At this point, moving up π^* also increases the distance to be covered to reach the target. Consequently, it requires further policy easing. The hoped-for outcome is that

inflation expectations respond quickly and positively to the announcement of a higher inflation target. Yet if further policy easing is difficult to implement, perhaps because of uncertainty or negative side effects of chosen instruments, the desired expectations effect may not materialize and trust in the central bank's ability to reach the target in the medium term might be damaged by such an announcement.

As follows from equation (8), the impact of a decline in r^* on the likelihood of the constraint on interest rate policy becoming binding can be directly offset by lowering i^{LB} . Central banks, including the ECB, have already implemented negative policy rates and found ways to cushion side effects on bank profitability. The targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) of the ECB now come with a rate as low as -1%. Thus, the lower bound i^{LB} must be below -1%. Relative to the studies from the late 1990s and early 2000s that informed the mid-term review of the ECB's strategy and assumed a lower bound of zero percent, the subsequent decline in r^* is roughly offset by a decline in the assumed lower bound i^{LB} . Thus, the available space for policy easing from the nominal steady state rate has remained roughly the same.

Finally, the question of inflation measure that was discussed earlier in this note also has an important effect on the non-negativity constraint and the available policy space. In particular, if the central bank considers switching to a measure of inflation that implies a higher value for π_{t-1} , the constraint becomes less binding. In this regard, whether or not import prices or the costs of owner-occupied housing are included in the measure that the ECB chooses to target makes a difference.

5 Conclusions for the monetary policy strategy of the ECB

The findings discussed in this note have a number of implications for the questions raised by President Lagarde and thus for the review of the ECB's strategy.

First, the relative behaviour of key measures of inflation such as the HICP and the GDP deflator has changed. Up to 2007 they showed very similar dynamics. Since then, the HICP has become much more variable and, on average, has come in lower between 2013 and 2018, a period of recovery of the euro area economy and quantitative easing by the ECB, than in the preceding period of recession. This behaviour appears to be largely driven by import price dynamics. Domestic goods price inflation, as measured by the GDP deflator, has shown more of tendency to increase along with this economic recovery and policy easing. Similarly, indices of the costs of owner-occupied housing that is not included in the HICP have been rising faster during this recovery.

So far, the ECB has exclusively focused on the HICP measure of inflation when defining its inflation objective and communicating with the public. One option would be to switch the inflation measure. For example, the ECB could choose to target the GDP deflator. This would reduce the role of highly variable import prices in policy considerations. Incidentally, New Keynesian macroeconomic theory would imply that the central bank should focus on stabilizing a measure of those prices that are subject to rigidities in order to avoid inefficient changes in relative prices. This might

be better achieved by targeting a measure such as the GDP deflator, which includes a wider range of prices of domestic companies that are potentially subject to price rigidities than the HICP, while excluding highly variable import prices.

In my view, however, it is not necessary to go as far as switching the inflation measure. The ECB's strategy leaves sufficient room to consider inflation more broadly in policy communication and the HICP should not be the only consideration. The imprecision regarding the length of the "medium-term" horizon and the numerical target "below but close to 2%" offers flexibility to include other measures in policy deliberations and communications.

In particular, it would be sensible to explain differences in the dynamics of HICP and the GDP deflator (or a suitably calculated measure of the domestic goods component in a consumption deflator) to the public. It ought to be relevant for policy deliberations and communications if these measures move in opposite directions rather than in the same direction. Furthermore, the ECB could ask statistical offices to include the costs of owner-occupied housing to the HICP. If that is not possible, the ECB could nevertheless include such information in its policy communication.

Furthermore, at the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates, an optimal strategy would be to bring inflation back to the target more slowly than in normal situations when monetary policy is not constrained by the lower bound. Reasons for such policy attenuation include uncertainty about the effectiveness of QE as well as the risk of potential negative side effects. A balancing of benefits and side effects of QE would be consistent with a slower return of inflation to target than in earlier periods.

A possible decline in the longer-term equilibrium interest rate reduces the available space for interest rate cuts and may increase the need for using balance sheet policy in the future. The question of the space for interest rate cuts in the time of low inflation and recession was already an important issue at the mid-term review. It was part of the reason for the clarification that the ECB aims at keeping inflation below, but close to, 2%. At the time, however, the lower bound was thought to be zero. Since then, the ECB has explored negative interest rate territory. As a result, it has been discovered that the lower bound must be quite a bit lower than zero percent.

Raising the inflation target would reduce the likelihood of a binding lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates in a stochastic steady state. Yet, when inflation is low and the central bank's policy rate is already near the constraint, such a change of strategy is a tricky proposition. It increases the distance to target that needs to be covered and requires further policy easing. Thus, announcing a higher target at this time may not achieve the desired increase in inflation expectations and instead reduce the credibility of the strategy. Furthermore, a substantial increase in the inflation target may not be consistent with a mandate to maintain price stability.

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