CESifo Economic Studies Conference

What's wrong with modern macroeconomics?

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A macroeconomic agenda:
Compare competing paradigms and identify robust policy recommendations

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#### **Competing paradigms?**

Recently, I read the following in a German newspaper article:

"Already in 1992 leading economists – among them Nobel prize winners Paul Samuelson and Franco Modigliani – warned of the danger of an ,intellectual monopoly' in economics and demanded a `pluralistic spirit in economic science that respects different approaches and encourages critical and tolerant dialogue'.

Source: American Economic Review. (Not confirmed yet).

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## There exists an established model comparison approach in macro ...

#### **Examples:**

- ☐ Brookings Institution, 1988, 1989, 1993
  - → Bryant, Currie, Frenkel, Masson, Portes, (eds.) (1989), Bryant, Hooper, Mann (eds) (1993)
- □ NBER:

Taylor (ed.) (1999)

Note! Comparisons involved several reseacher teams, each team working with its own model.

## Identify robust policy recommendations ...

☐ Taylor (1993) credits the 1993 comparison as the crucial testing ground for the Taylor rule. (not an estimated rule / normative).

$$i_t = 2 + \pi_t + 0.5(\pi_t - \pi) + 0.5y_t$$

Modeling paradigms considered in these comparisons:

Different Keynesian-style macroeconometric models (nominal rigidities) with rational or adaptive expectations.

#### **Proposal: New comparative approach**

- ☐ Given renewed wide disagreement about appropriate models for monetary, fiscal and financial stabilization policies, a comparative rather than insular approach would help improve model building and policy analysis.
  - → Example: "A New Comparative Approach to Macroeconomic Modelling and Policy Analysis", Wieland, Cwik, Mueller, Wolters Schmidt, 2009.

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#### A new comparative approach ...

- → Formal exposition of approach (comparability)
- → Computational implementation
- → Model archive (U.S., Euro, multi-country models).
- → Platform makes a wide range of models available for individual researchers to compare and include their own model easily. (Innovation over earlier NBER, Brookings comparisons).

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## Which modeling paradigms should be considered and compared today?

- My focus: Models usable as testing grounds for monetary and fiscal stabilization policies.
- ☐ Exclusion criteria?
  - → Proposal: Compare models that have been estimated to fit the dynamics of key macroeconomic time series.

Output, inflation and interest rates at a minimum.

### **Competing modeling paradigms**

- Which modeling paradigms should be considered and compared today?
  - → New-Keynesian DSGE models with explicit micro-foundations (representative agent, rational expectations)
  - → Real-business-cycle models
  - → Earlier generation of New-Keynesian macro models, i.e. nominal rigidities and rational expectations (less stringent microfoundations)
  - → More traditional Keynesian-style models with adaptive expectations (used by many business economists)

## What other new paradigms could be brought into the comparison?

■ Models with learning market participants

Available for the case of homogenous expectations: Evans & Honkapohja, Orphanides & Williams, Gaspar, Vestin & Smets, Milani, Slobodyan & Wouters.

☐ Additional novel approaches with potential relevance for the financial crisis experience.

Models in which market participants have heterogenous beliefs and/or exhibit different behavioral responses.

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#### **Heterogenous beliefs**

- □ Rational and diverse beliefs (Mordecai Kurz and collaborators). (criteria: fit to sample moments).
- Boundedly rational market participants with diverse prediction rules, evolutionary selection of such rules. (Brock, Hommes and collaborators, De Grauwe).
- Agent-based macroeconomics.
- Behavioral macroeconomics.

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## A formal approach to model comparison

- Consider a particular model  $m \in M$
- Model output is usually not directly comparable
  - Different variables
  - ▶ Different structural assumptions
  - Different notation and definitions
- Therefore it is necessary to augment models with a set of common, comparable variables, parameters, equations and shocks.

#### **Notation**

Table: Model-Specific Variables, Parameters, Shocks and Equations

Notation	Description
$x_t^m$	endogenous variables in model m
$x_t^{m,g}$	policy variables in model $\emph{m}$ (also incl. in $x_t^m$ )
$\eta_t^m$	policy shocks in model m
$\epsilon_t^m$	other economic shocks in model m
$g_m(.)$	policy rules in model <i>m</i>
$f_m(.)$	other model equations in model m
$\gamma^m$	policy rule parameters in model <i>m</i>
$\beta^m$	other economic parameters in model <i>m</i>
$\Sigma^m$	covariance matrix of shocks in model m

### A general nonlinear model

Define a particular model m as follows:

$$E_t[g_m(x_t^m, x_{t+1}^m, x_{t-1}^m, \eta_t^m, \gamma^m)] = 0$$
(1)

$$E_t[f_m(x_t^m, x_{t+1}^m, x_{t-1}^m, \epsilon_t^m, \beta^m)] = 0, (2)$$

where

$$E([(\eta_t^m)'(\epsilon_t^m)']') = 0 (3)$$

$$E([(\eta_t^m)'(\epsilon_t^m)']'[(\eta_t^m)'(\epsilon_t^m)']) = \Sigma^m = \begin{pmatrix} \Sigma_\eta^m & \Sigma_{\eta\epsilon}^m \\ \Sigma_{\eta\epsilon}^m & \Sigma_{\epsilon}^m \end{pmatrix}$$
(4)

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## Augment with ...

Table: Comparable Common Variables, Parameters, Shocks and Equations

Notation	Description
$z_t$	common variables in all models
$z_t^g$	common policy variables in all models (also incl. in $z_t$ )
$\eta_t$	common policy shocks in all models
g(.)	common policy rules
γ	common policy rule parameters

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### The augmented model

The augmented model consists of three components:

- The common policy rules g(.) expressed in terms of common variables  $z_t$ , policy shocks  $\eta_t$  and policy rule parameters  $\gamma$ .
- A set of new model-specific equations that define the common variables in terms of original model-specific endogenous variables,  $h_m(.)$  with parameters  $\theta^m$ .
- The original set of model equations  $f_m(.)$  determining endogenous variables, excluding the model-specific policy rule  $g_m(.)$ .

$$E_t[g(z_t, z_{t+1}, z_{t-1}, \eta_t, \gamma)] = 0$$
(5)

$$E_t[h_m(z_t, x_t^m, x_{t+1}^m, x_{t-1}^m, \theta^m)] = 0$$
(6)

$$E_t[f_m(x_t^m, x_{t+1}^m, x_{t-1}^m, \epsilon_t^m, \beta^m)] = 0 (7)$$

#### **Model solution**

General model solution:

$$z_{t} = k_{z}(z_{t-1}, x_{t-1}^{m}, \eta_{t}, \epsilon_{t}^{m}, \kappa_{z})$$
 (8)

$$x_t^m = k_x(z_{t-1}, x_{t-1}^m, \eta_t, \epsilon_t^m, \kappa_x)$$
 (9)

where  $(\kappa_z, \kappa_x)$  denote the reduced-form parameters that are in turn complex functions of the structural parameters,  $\beta^m$ , the policy parameters,  $\gamma$ , and the covariance matrix  $\Sigma^m$ .

### **Steps**

- Approximate and solve.
- ☐ Construct measures of interest (volatilities, persistence, ..)
- Evaluate performance under different policy measures or rules.
- □ Apply criteria for choosing a policy under model uncertainty. (robustness).

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## Application: Euro area fiscal stimulus, Cwik and Wieland (2009)

□ 2008/9: EERP

→ The European Economic Recovery Plan

→ National plans: for example, in Germany, Konjunkturpaket 1 und 2

- □ Investigate magnitude of government spending increases and tax reductions for 2009 and 2010.
- Use multiple models to assess impact of government spending on euro area GDP

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## How big is the Euro area stimulus?

Total Package in %GDP: 2009: **1.01** 2010: **0.85** Expenditures in %GDP: 2010: **0.58** 2010: **0.22** 

German stimulus 50 % of EU 11

German gov. expenditures: 43% of EU 11

German package %GDP: 3.37% (09: 1.44% 10: 1.93%)

#### **EU 11 Stimuli**

	Total fiscal packag			
	(bln Euro)			
country	2009	2010		
Austria	4.9	4.6		
Belgium	1.3	1.2		
Germany	35.9	48.4		
Greece	0	0		
Spain	26.8	14.7		
Finland	2.4	2.4		
France	17	4		
Ireland	0	0		
Italy	-0.3	-0.8		
Netherlands	3.1	2.9		
Portugal	1	0.3		
EU-11	92	77.6		

#### **EU 11 Stimuli**

	Expenditures		
	(bln Euro)		
country	2009	2010	
Austria	1.4	1	
Belgium	0.9	0.8	
Germ any	18	13.6	
Greece	0	0	
Spain	12.1	0	
Finland	0.4	0.4	
France	16.3	4	
Ireland	0	0	
Italy	3.1	0.2	
Netherlands	0.2	O	
Portugal	0.9	0.3	
EU-11	53.2	20.4	

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Table 1: Overview of the fiscal stimulus packages in the euro area

	Total fis	cal package	Expen	ditures	Total fis	cal package	Expe	nditures
	(bli	n Euro)	(bln :	Euro)	(percei	nt of GDP)	(percen	t of GDP)
country	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010
Austria	4.9	4.6	1.4	1	1.71	1.63	0.48	0.36
Belgium	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.36	0.33	0.27	0.24
Germany	35.9	48.4	18	13.6	1.44	1.93	0.72	0.54
Greece	0	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Spain	26.8	14.7	12.1	0	2.44	1.34	1.10	0.00
Finland	2.4	2.4	0.4	0.4	1.25	1.25	0.23	0.23
France	17	4	16.3	4	0.87	0.2	0.83	0.2
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Italy	-0.3	-0.8	3.1	0.2	-0.02	-0.05	0.19	0.01
Netherlands	3.1	2.9	0.2	0	0.53	0.49	0.03	0.00
Portugal	1	0.3	0.9	0.3	0.6	0.18	0.54	0.18
EU-11	92	77.6	53.2	20.4	1.01	0.85	0.58	0.22


Source: Saha and von Weizsäcker (2009) "Estimating the size of the European stimulus packages for 2009 An Update" and the stability programs provided by the finance ministries for the European Commission.

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#### What is the GDP effect of the stimulus?

- ☐ Focus on government spending which promises the largest multipier.
- ☐ Start with Smets and Wouters (2003).
  - → Well-known, estimated, state-of-the-art New Keynesian DSGE model.
  - → Price and wage rigidities and other frictions.
  - →But rational, forward-looking households.

## **GDP Effect of Euro Area Spending**




Notes: Quarterly annualized government spending is depicted by the bars in percent of GDP: 0.29085 in 2009Q1, 0.5817 in 2009Q2, 0.727125 in 2009Q3 and 2009Q4 and 0.2225 in 2010.

#### **New-Keynesian DSGE Model**


- □ The increase in GDP quickly produces a permanent contraction in private sector saving and consumption. Big reduction in investment.
- ☐ Households anticipate that government debt incurred needs to be paid off with interest by raising taxes in the future. (Smets and Wouters assume lump-sum/ nondistortionary taxes)


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



#### **Model Uncertainty & Robustness**


- New-Keynesian DSGE models:
  - Smets and Wouters 2003, (ECB), Euro Area
  - Laxton&Pesenti 2003 (IMF), Euro Area +Cz.Rep.
  - EU- Euro area model 2009 (EU-QUEST) (35% liquidity-constrained consumers)
- New-Keynesian
  - Taylor G-7 model, 1993
- Old-Keynesian
  - ECB Area Wide model, 2004












## **Consumption and Investment**




#### How are interest rates set?

☐ Gerdesmeier-Roffia, Kuester-Wieland

$$r_t = 0.66r_{t-1} + 0.66\pi_t + 0.10y_t$$

- ☐ Consider 1 year of monetary accommodation (constant rate) then return to prescription of the rule.
- Motivation: we are near the zero bound, the central bank may want to set lower rates, therefore it will not increase rates immediately as the stimulus kicks in.

## **Monetary Accommodation in 2009**



# Cumulative Effect (output net of government spending)

	Percentage increase in real GDP			
	EU fiscal package EU fiscal pa			
	(2011Q1)	(2013Q4)		
Smets and Wouters (2003)	-0.20	-0.34		
ECB Area Wide Model	0.37	-0.18		
Taylor (1993)	0.04	-0.11		
Small IMF Model	-0.26	-0.55		
EU Quest Model	-0.25	-0.43		

Crowding out dominates.

#### **Conclusions: €Area Stimulus**

- ☐ Myth: "German package small"
- ☐ Spending multipliers: Confirms US analysis with multiple New Keynesian models,
- ☐ Concentrated in 2 years, slightly greater multipliers.
- ☐ Implementation lags mean effect in 09 Q1-2 negative.
- ☐ 1-year constant rate increases multiplier little.
- ☐ 2-4 years, signficant crowding-out.